The outcome of the meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Pervez Musharraf at Havana has evoked mixed reactions from various quarters within both India and Pakistan. It has also raised a number of questions to which there are no easy answers. The meeting, which took place on September 16 on the sidelines of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit, was obviously successful as it resulted in the resumption of the dialogue process, which had stalled in the aftermath of the Mumbai train blasts in July 2006. This forward movement assumes significance in the face of deteriorating bilateral relations as a fallout of the terrorist strikes in Mumbai. Worsening relations were evident in the maltreatment meted out to an Indian diplomat based in Islamabad in response to which India asked one of the staffers of the Pakistan High Commission to leave New Delhi. Questions also arose over the way Asma Jehangir, a well-known Pakistani lawyer and human rights activist, was treated while she was in India to attend a seminar. She felt affronted as the police frisked her hotel room, and Manmohan Singh subsequently tendered an apology to her. Such events in the last few months aggravated tensions and keeping in mind past precedent, the meeting between the two leaders was viewed with cautious optimism by analysts.
The Joint Statement issued by the two leaders includes a reiteration of earlier commitments to take the dialogue process forward and an agreement that their Foreign Secretaries would resume the composite dialogue soon. On the Jammu and Kashmir issue there was concurrence about the "need to build on convergences and narrow down divergences." While these elements of the Joint Statement have caused no surprise and seem to emphasise recourse to traditional positions taken by the two sides, one aspect that has caused consternation among certain sections in India is the decision to "put in place an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations." Added to this is the statement by India's foreign secretary designate, Shiv Shankar Menon, that "Terror is a threat to Pakistan. It has been a threat to India for a long time now. Both of us need to deal with it." This statement is clearly a marked departure from the earlier stance consistently maintained by India. A statement of this kind, which would otherwise have been unpalatable in India by any standard measure, connotes a few pointers. First, it seems to have created some space for India to include symbolic or soft gestures in its diplomatic negotiating strategy. Second, it is perhaps an attempt at mood gauging by the Indian side to see what kind of reaction it begets from Pakistan. Third, it tries to convince the international community about India's sincere commitments and attempts to not only address the issue of terrorism but also solve outstanding issues with Pakistan.
Reactions among some sections of the Pakistani intelligentsia have been positive. An editorial in a leading Pakistani newspaper Dawn has referred to the meeting between the two leaders as a "Breakthrough" and expressed the hope that the joint mechanism would "help avoid misunderstandings" between the two countries. Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesperson Tasnim Aslam, while speaking to the media in Islamabad about the mechanism, stated that, "The purpose is to help the two countries prevent acts of terrorism."
However, it is difficult to believe that the joint mechanism will be successful, given the linkages of the Pakistani establishment, including the Army and the ISI, with Islamic extremist groups. While Musharraf has been careful to project his increasing disdain for jihadi organisations, this is not commensurate with actions taken on the ground with respect to organisations pursuing an anti-India agenda. Soft targets like civilians within India continued to face the brunt of terrorist attacks through 2005-2006. While external pressures may force Musharraf to adopt a moderate posture, any forward movement towards counter-terrorism would be hamstrung due to the internal compulsions inherent in the nature of the Pakistani state. Musharraf's ability to deliver would depend on whether he is able to take his main constituency, the Army, along with him. But as of now the intentions of this dominant player in Pakistani politics, of which the President himself is a significant component, is suspect. The doubt persists as to whether the military's strategy of aggregating power by using jihadi organisations as a means of achieving foreign policy goals will be dumped. In fact, this qualm is evident in the opinion in India, which has been divided post-Havana. Former Intelligence personnel like B Raman and Ajit Doval and former diplomat G Parthasarathy have been critical of the Indian government's change in stance.
On the other hand, noted strategic analyst K Subrahmanyam is of the view that the joint mechanism is "a step forward" as "Pakistan has accepted that terrorism is a problem between the two countries" and would have to "answer specific allegations and charges." While the Indian government continues to work towards eliminating the scourge of terrorism, only time will reveal the efficacy of the joint mechanism, the modalities of which are not fully identified. Questions arise about whether Pakistan would be more willing than it has been till now, to accept or act on terrorism related information supplied by India. It is more than apparent that Pakistan's leadership has increasingly been worried about internal security and has been undertaking efforts to clamp down on terrorist elements fomenting trouble within the country. Yet, it has continued to use terrorism as an instrument of strategic objectives vis-à-vis India, either by directly promoting terrorism within India, or through third countries like Bangladesh or Nepal. What is common knowledge now, and what was reported in the Pakistani media at the time, is that anti-India terrorist organisations were allowed to carry out relief activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) after the October 8 earthquake last year. Recent reports in the Pakistani newsmagazine Herald (August 2006) attest to the fact that organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad have registered as relief organisations adopting different names. By ordinary logic such activities would be in contravention of the most significant aspect of the joint statement issued by then Prime Minister Vajpayee and Musharraf on January 6, 2004, wherein the Pakistani president gave the assurance that "he would not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner." The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesman, articulating the government's position after the Mumbai blasts, had stated that, "India remains committed to the dialogue process with Pakistan but this can be sustained and can yield results only if Pakistan acts against groups operating from territory under its control, in accordance with its solemn commitments enshrined in the Joint Press Statement of January 6, 2004."
While the agreement to create a joint mechanism for fighting terrorism can provide shape and substance to the declared willingness of Pakistan to co-operate with India in countering terrorism in the region, there is considerable scepticism in India whether the key players in the game of terrorism in the Pakistani establishment will allow this to happen.
If current trends are any indication, the global financial system will witness a unique 'first' in mid-October when China's foreign exchange reserves are expected to cross US$ 1 trillion.
According to China's central bank, the People's Bank of China, which issues official figures on the nation's foreign exchange reserves on a quarterly basis, foreign exchange reserves totalled $ 941.1 billion at the end of June 2006. Buoyed by trading surpluses and capital inflow, reserves rose by a further $ 13.4 billion to reach $ 954.5 billion at the end of July 2006. If current trends are any indication - an average monthly growth in forex reserves of $ 19.4 billion in the first seven months of this year - the $ 46 billion required to reach a trillion can be accumulated by the middle of October. These figures translate into a 30.3 per cent growth from $ 732.7 billion computed from the end of July 2005 to the present.
The management of this large accumulation of foreign exchange is undoubtedly a challenging task as reflected in opinions expressed by Chinese officials and economists alike. In an undated essay that has been widely cited and carried on the official web site www.studytimes.com.cn, the Vice President of China, Zeng Qinghong has said that China will continue to "perfect" the yuan exchange rate mechanism as part of work to be done in the second half of this year. Adopting a cautious approach, he said China "should use comprehensive measures to control further large gains in its forex reserves" and should expand the use of forex reserves by increasing imports for reserves of "important strategic resources." Zeng also called for the utilisation of the large forex holdings to hasten the transformation of key state enterprises and to encourage individuals to hold more foreign exchange. To allay fears of an 'overheating' of the economy, he has recommended that China "pay strong attention to structural macroeconomic adjustment to shift its growth model." In his view, "the foreign exchange reserves have reflected China's growing economic power but on the other hand they have increased exchange rate risks and added upward pressure on the yuan."
The question uppermost in the minds of policy makers, analysts and observers is indeed a very basic one. What does China propose to do with a trillion dollars as forex reserves? Are the strong reserves driving China's acquisition of energy and mineral assets all over the globe? In the words of Peng Xinyun, an economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the top government think tank, "the US has rich oil resources but it still purchases a lot of crude oil. If they can do it, why not us?"
The accumulation of large forex reserves by China has the potential to be a double-edged sword for the region. In an indirect acknowledgement that the lessons of Asia's 1997 financial meltdown have been learnt (although China escaped the consequences), China's experience in generating trade surpluses is having a salutary effect all over Southeast Asia with countries of the region competing with one another to generate trade surpluses and higher economic growth. The flip side of strong currency reserves is that currencies of the region will increasingly opt for full convertibility, that in the very first place generated the financial crisis of 1997. In China's case, the debate has been for quite some time on whether the renminbi is accurately valued or not. Since China revalued its currency by 2.1 per cent in July 2005, ending the currency's decade-long peg to the dollar, the yuan has risen only at a snails pace, sparking fresh demands for more rapid change. To keep its currency stable, China has to absorb foreign capital, that conversely increases the supply of money in its domestic economy. This calls for some fiscal juggling by central bankers to avoid an inflationary spiral that could wreck the very foundation of China's 'socialist market economy.'
Some attitudes do seem to be changing within China and there has been a growing chorus of calls from Chinese economists and officials to allow the yuan to strengthen at a faster rate. To the chagrin of China's central bankers, reserves are growing by $ 200 billion a year and without a dramatic shift in China's economic structure they will surpass $ 1.4 trillion and approach $ 1.5 trillion in 2008. According to Ba Shusong, vice head of the financial research institute at the cabinet's Development Research Centre, the central bank faces the choice of achieving real appreciation either by letting the yuan fluctuate within a wider range or accepting higher inflation. While China says that it will allow more flexibility in its forex management regime, it also feels that it must move at its own pace rather than risk a major shock to its financial system. It claims that it has already taken significant steps towards reforming its currency and will continue to do so on a gradual basis and will not be pressured into making dramatic changes - reflecting a strong ethos of 'financial sovereignty.'
However, some observers believe that China could be forced into further change sooner rather than later, since the massive fund inflows accompanying the trade surplus pose enormous policy challenges under a rigid exchange rate regime. Some Chinese officials argue that the money would be better spent recapitalising the state banks or by importing oil and building up strategic reserves, of which it currently has none. Others say the money should be used to fund overseas acquisitions by Chinese firms. Conservatives want to keep the money in financial instruments. They say, quite rightly, that the inflow of hot money is only a temporary phenomenon and point to the billions of dollars of liabilities in bad loans held by the state banks, pension and welfare liabilities and debts owed by securities firms.
It is surmised that how China invests this accumulated reserves will definitely influence the monetary policy of several industrialized countries, most notably the United States. From its forex reserves, it holds more than $ 200 billion in US treasury bonds, according to the South China Morning Post, and an unknown amount of instruments in other currencies, including the euro, yen, sterling, Hong Kong dollars and Swiss francs. The possibility of China offloading some of its treasury bonds leading to a rise in US interest rates does find favour with a few commentators. These rather alarmist interpretations speak of a tighter monetary policy and the beginnings of an economic slow-down that could spread all over the industrialised world, should China take such a drastic step. Just as how Japan did not abandon its US investments after the crash of its 'bubble economy' in the late 1980s, so too the Chinese might not want to risk by short selling their US Treasury bonds.
What is clear from the debate on what to do with an embarrassingly large forex reserve is that China is heavily dependent on cheap exports as part of its booming economy and any sudden strengthening of the yuan would only end up damaging local export industries and hurt the country's financial system. That in turn might create higher unemployment - and engender social unrest. Beijing is most likely to adopt a policy of 'gradualism' as witnessed in its year on year increase in providing economic aid to neighbours and exercise its options by spreading its leverage and influence to emerge as Asia's fulcrum from a financial point of view.
The meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf on the sidelines of the Havana non-aligned summit is being projected as an important breakthrough on the issue of terrorism as well as with regard to the broad contours of Indo-Pak relations. The meeting was significant as it was held in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts, which had led to some tough talk by India. This Indian outburst underlined the frustration and limits of its tolerance to Pakistan's continued support to terrorism. As New Delhi suspended the peace process, it demanded that Pakistan demonstrate its commitment to the various assurances it has given to India since January 2004.
The January 6, 2004, agreement between President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee on the sidelines of the SAARC summit had initiated a new beginning in India-Pakistan relations. Musharraf gave a personal assurance that he will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner against India. Both countries underlined the fact that constructive dialogue would promote progress towards the common objective of peace, security and economic development for both peoples and for future generations. The peace process was renewed with fresh vigour and various bus and rail linkages were announced to promote people-to-people contacts. At the same time, while Pakistan insisted on a resolution of the Kashmir issue within a time-frame so as to foster meaningful relations and enhance regional stability, India wanted to move on the charted path of composite dialogue on the eight identified issues. Subsequently, meetings have taken place between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf on the sidelines of the UNGA as well as at the summit level in New Delhi in April 2005. And on each of these occasions, they reiterated their commitment to bilateral dialogue and peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue - an oft-repeated statement that emanates after every Indo-Pak meeting.
Though both countries are committed to bilateral dialogue, incidents of terrorist violence have not only continued in Kashmir but have also occurred elsewhere in India. All these incidents have the imprint of the involvement of Pakistan-based jihadi groups. It is in this context that the latest joint statement becomes important. The question that needs to be asked is whether it addresses the issue of terrorism that India has been facing for the past decade and a half? The joint statement issued in Havana reiterated Pakistan's commitments towards addressing the issue of terrorism and India's assurance to move forward with the peace process and resume the mechanism of the Secretary-level composite dialogue. One can thus discern a clear linkage between the issue of Pakistan's support for terrorism and the Indo-Pak peace process. The irony of the situation is that soon after the Havana joint statement Indian investigating agencies confirmed the involvement of the Lashkar-e-Taiba in the Mumbai blasts.
The joint statement issued at Havana also speaks of a joint institutional mechanism to identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations. Instead of merely accusing Pakistan, India can now take its complaints to the anti-terror institution, the modalities of which are to be agreed by the two countries. In the past, however, Pakistan has been reluctant to co-operate with India on the issue of terrorism. It has denied that Dawood Ibrahim resides in its territory even though its own media has acknowledged his presence. The Pakistan High Commissioner's interview to CNN-IBN on September 20, 2006 makes it clear that it is not within the purview of this mechanism to deal with terror masterminds like Dawood. In the early nineties Pakistan had also denied the existence of Kashmiri militant camps in its soil. Intelligence sharing on terrorist activities with India has never been looked at with favour by the ISI. It has nurtured and sponsored terrorist outfits and has a stake in their sustenance, since they constitute a vital component of Pakistan's strategy against India. Many Pakistani analysts have argued that the only way to get India to the negotiating table is through terror. Pakistan's repeated assurances to India on this issue have not resulted in anything concrete. In fact, it was the realization that Pakistan had not done enough that led India to stall the peace process in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts.
Pakistan not addressing the issue of terrorism can imply two things. First it is not willing to address the issue; and second, it is incapable of controlling the terrorists. Pakistan has taken the stand that it does not control all the extremist elements operating from its territory. This may be true to some extent. However, it is also true that Pakistan's actions against some of these terrorist elements have been cosmetic at best, while some of its actions against the Jaish-i-Mohammad, for example, arose out of domestic compulsions. Pakistan's ban on the Lashkar has not been effective in controlling its activities. The Lashkar simply changed its name to Jamaat-ud-Dawa and its Chief, Hafeez Saeed, was provided with all the comforts during his house arrest. Not surprisingly, in the above-mentioned interview, the Pakistan High Commissioner opined that the Jamaat-ud-Dawa is a charitable organization, when it is an acknowledged fact that it is a front organization of the LeT. This view clearly underlines the fact that for the agreed joint mechanism to work, both countries need to harmonise their definition of terrorism and terrorist groups. Banning terrorist organizations does not resolve the issue since these outfits resurface in another name. The terrorist infrastructure within Pakistan is still intact and it is difficult to imagine that the precision with which they have carried out various terrorist acts in India is accomplished without the knowledge of the ISI.
Now what does the Joint Mechanism imply in terms of actually addressing the issue. It is merely another mechanism for India to lodge complaints about the activities of Pakistan- based and -sponsored terrorists in India. Since the issue is to be addressed by the representative of both countries, it is likely to result only in a war of words, given that Pakistan has used a studied policy of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy against India. Secondly, it is doubtful that the terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir will be brought within the ambit of this joint mechanism. Pakistan does not consider jihadi violence in Jammu and Kashmir as terrorism and has generally portrayed these terrorists as 'freedom fighters'. As has been the case in the past, it is more than likely that Pakistan will continue to play semantic games.
With or without the joint mechanism, the fight against terrorism is India's own war. It is not for the first time that India has withdrawn its demand to stop cross border terrorism as a precondition for the initiation of dialogue. Earlier, India had insisted on the same conditions for resumption of dialogue in 1993, in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999, and again after the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, only to resume talks without Pakistan moving an inch on the Indian preconditions. And now we see the same trend being repeated in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts! Suspension of dialogue has limited success in putting pressure on Pakistan. It has never complied with Indian demands and has taken only cosmetic steps with token political symbolism. From Kashmir, terrorist activities have now expanded to other parts of India.
Though the continuation of bilateral dialogue is important for both countries to move forward, the joint mechanism to fight terrorism would not help India in any substantive manner. Both countries are already engaged in addressing the issue as part of the composite dialogue at the Home Secretaries level. And at the multilateral level, the countries of SAARC have signed a protocol on terrorism. In fact, the Kathmandu SAARC summit clearly brought out the differences on the definition of terrorism. The issue of terrorism has not been addressed not because there is a dearth of institutional mechanisms, but because Pakistan's commitment to the issue is lacking. Given the nature of Indo-Pak relations and the functioning of other institutional mechanisms that have been in place for some time, the latest mechanism is yet another forum for India to communicate its grievances and for Pakistan to dole out its false assurances.
The India-South Korea bilateral relationship is a remarkable example of how trade is the primary driver in global relationships. Ideology, which marked international relations in the previous decades, has given way to trade - which now is the international marker for relations. An important watershed in the relationship will be the beginning of construction for the POSCO integrated steel plant, which is slated to begin in April 2007 and would constitute the single largest foreign investment in India at US$ 12 b. The recent bid by an Indian group for the takeover of a Korean electronic division is an indicator of the confidence in the economic story on both sides. The transformation in their relationship is unique, since diplomatic relations were established only in 1973 and the fact that South Korea is hemmed between its two larger neighbours, Japan and China. India-South Korea ties during the decades since the formation of the South Korean state were marked by token visits and a lack of convergence in the political realm. The strength of the bilateral relationship today can be ascertained from the fact that while bilateral trade in the financial year 1992-1993 was a mere $ 530 m, it is expected to touch nearly $ 10 b during 2006-2007. The vibrant nature of the relationship between the two has improved with the visits of the President of Korea Roh Moo Hyun to India in 2004, followed by that of President Abdul Kalam to Korea in February 2006.
The liberalisation of the Indian economy in 1991 under "The New Economic Policy" heralded a spurt in trade and investment related activities. The reforms were influenced by the East Asian success story and South Korea was among the chief countries to have an impact on the Indian policy makers' thinking process. India's "Look East Policy," launched in 1992, helped the bilateral process as well as to foster closer relations with North East Asia and the ASEAN. The reform process happened at the right time in terms of the South Korean business's search for alternative markets for investment and to hedge their investment risk since the primary destination for their investments till then was China. India's New Economic policy offered South Korean investors a conductive environment for conducting business operations. Also, what is important to bear in mind is the change in the Korean trade policy from export oriented to trade oriented (investment based). From the South Korean viewpoint, boosting their investments in the global markets was an objective to solve the difficulties that arose from the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and to achieve a greater balance between the domestic and world markets. The Indian market offered a huge potential for Korean business.
Today, South Korean business groups have a firm presence in the Indian market. The primary areas of business that Korean firms in India are in are transportation, electronics, and metallurgical industries, chemical and industrial machinery. South Korea today is the fifth largest investor in India and India is the fifteenth largest investor in Korea. Bilateral trade has witnessed a phenomenal growth since the opening up of the economy, registering a 40 per cent rise during the financial year 2005-2006 compared to the previous financial year. The current bilateral trade for the financial year 2005-2006 stands at $ 6391.06 m. The $12 b POSCO project signifies the strength in the bilateral economic activity achieved in a short span. During the visit of President Roh Moo Hyun, the two sides had projected to achieve bilateral trade of over $10 b by the year 2007. And true to the mark, the target looks set to be achieved.
Indian companies have also invested in the Korean market and acquired Korean companies in the transportation sector. Recently, an Indian company has bid for an electronic division of an erstwhile chaebol in South Korea offering $ 700 m for it. Indian exports to the Korean market have increased. During the last financial year, goods and services worth $ 1827.2 m were exported, a growth of 75 per cent over the previous year. The IT sector too has seen a tremendous upsurge in co-operation and expansion into the Korean market. During his visit to Korea earlier this year, President Kalam called for greater co-operation in the field of science and technology to harness the potential for strengthening the relationship. He stressed on the fact that the Korean prowess in the field of computer hardware and the Indian software capabilities had great joint potential.
The meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Roh Moo Hyun on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit last year resulted in an agreement for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to further the economic relationship. The proposed agreement, to be signed next year, would further strengthen economic ties and add greater substance to the bilateral relationship. The CEPA would focus not only on improving trade ties but also look at improving co-operation in services and broadening the investment areas.
Along with a convergence of interests in combating international terrorism, the two countries are strong supporters of the United Nations. Seoul, however, opposes the expansion of the Security Council to include the Group of Four comprising India, Japan, Brazil and Germany. Its opposition is Japan centric for historical reasons. South Korea and India also share common concerns about the proliferation of WMD technology, given the past experience of the North Korean regime transferring missile technology to Pakistan and the unearthing of the "AQ Khan cartel". This is something that is bound to adversely harm the security interests of both nations. South Korea, which is a signatory of the NPT, has looked for a peaceful resolution regarding the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, a move supported by India. India has also welcomed the efforts of the South Korean government to engage Pyongyang under the "Sunshine Policy."
There is a synergy in the relationship between the two economies, which indicates tremendous potential for growth. Indian and Korean companies are currently actively involved in joint exploration for energy resources and have joint collaboration in researching for cleaner fuels. Oil companies from the two countries have jointly explored gas reserves off the Myanmar coast. There are opportunities for Korean small and medium enterprises (SME) to synergise with Indian SMEs in the areas of semi-conductors, plastics, auto parts, agricultural instruments, textiles, multi-media, ceramic products, software etc. The two countries could set up joint collaborations in the infrastructure sector -- power, ports, telecommunications, ship building & repair, petrochemicals, automobile ancillary, electrical & electronics, banking & financial services, software as well as iron & steel. With the Indian government's emphasis on infrastructure development (roads, ports, communications, energy), in the coming years, there will be a huge growth in infrastructure development activity, which will involve a lot of co-operation.
The Indo-South Korean relationship is one that has and will be defined by economic ties. As emphasized by President Abdul Kalam during his Korea visit, there will be an increase in joint research between the two countries to harness their combined strength. The growth of the Indian economy will offer the potential for greater trade and opportunity for Indian companies to acquire Korean companies in keeping with their international strategy, while at the same time providing Korean companies the chance to expand further. There exists a convergence of views between the two on topics that affect the world such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, energy security and the hegemony of any single power in the Asian region. It is in itself a unique relationship, one in which geography has not dictated the relationship but common interests and economic ties have. It is the fruition of India's "Economic Reforms" and 'Look East" policy. What the relationship offers is a successful model for India to replicate with other countries, as the Indian economy becomes a powerhouse in the global economy.
Thailand is once again at the crossroads of political uncertainty and the entry of the military in the affairs of the state has created a sense of instability. On September 19, 2006, the Thai armed forces dismissed the Thai Rat Thai Party government and revoked the country's 1997 constitution even though acting Prime Minster Thaksin Shinawatra has announced a state of emergency in Thailand. General Sondhi Boonyaratkalin, the army chief, has assumed prime ministerial powers till alternate political arrangements are made.
The last couple of months saw a seesaw battle between Thaksin Shinawatra and the Opposition over the issue of free and fair elections, which were scheduled for October 15 but were indefinitely postponed by the ousted prime minister. This created a sense of political uncertainty and seems to have provided an opportunity for the Army to take over the reins of power. The Thaksin government, which came to power in 2001 in the aftermath of the financial crisis, instituted populist measures like cheap loans and government handouts. The resultant popularity enabled it to retain power in the 2005 elections. It seemed that Thailand would slowly regain its pre-crisis economic growth, which was 6.1 per cent in 2004 though it slumped to 4.5 per cent in 2005.
But the Thaksin administration came under fire over his handling of several issues. The first of these related to his administration's ineffective handling of the Muslim insurgency in the southern provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces since January 2004. Thaksin took a hard-line stance against the problem in southern Thailand, going to the extent of declaring a sizeable number of villages in the three provinces as a "Red Zone". This meant that they would not be able to obtain developmental funds from the government while at the same time empowering the Army to undertake strong measures to curb the rebellion. Thaksin's reputation was also severely damaged when 78 Muslims who were protesting against government apathy died in police custody in October 2004 in Southern Thailand.
At the same time, he faced strong criticism and opposition on the issue of the sale of shares in his family owned Shin Corp (one of the biggest telecom companies of Thailand) to Singapore's government owned investment company Temasek Holdings. The sale of 49.6 per cent stake in Shin Corp for US $ 1.9 billion on January 23 came under fire since it was on the same day that Thaksin had raised the limitation on foreign ownership in Shin Corp to 49 per cent from the previous 25 per cent. He also evaded taxes on the capital gained through this sale. This incensed the opposition Democrat Party, which launched an intense move to upstage his government.
Thaksin also antagonized the labour unions by privatizing the country's Electricity Generating Authority and by conducting negotiations with the United States for a free trade agreement. He added to the forces ranged against him by curbing press freedom and by granting favours to close business associates and relatives.
The first attempt to impeach Thaksin was started in February 2006 by 28 senators through an appeal in the Constitutional Court. But this was rejected by the Court. The mass rallies that followed were led by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a conglomeration of opposition parties and NGOs. PAD was led by Sondhi Limthongkul, General Chamlong Srimuang (both former allies of Thaksin) and Thaksin's political rivals. Thaksin reacted by dissolving the parliament on February 24 and announcing general elections for April 2. The April 2 elections and April 23 bye-elections were boycotted by the opposition parties and even though Thaksin's party 'Thai Rat Thai' won a sizeable majority this did not bring legitimacy to his government because of the failure to produce a non-partisan upper house (the Senate), which is considered necessary to ensure checks and balance in the functioning of the government. The Constitutional Court invalidated the results of these elections contested by the Thai Rat Thai alone, in a judgement delivered on May 8, 2006. It even asked the election commissioners to resign and when the latter refused to comply, they were jailed and subsequently removed from their official positions. However, it needs to be mentioned here that a virtual one party election is allowed in the Thai constitution, provided the sole party contesting elections has enough support of the electorate and wins at least 20 per cent of the popular vote.
Though Thaksin had subsequently given assurances that he would not contest the elections scheduled for October 15, he has been nursing the ambition of running again as a prime ministerial candidate. His decision to postpone the October elections created frenzy among the Opposition and the military coup of two days ago is a direct fallout of this crisis. Military leaders have claimed that they have the support of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who is a revered figure in Thailand, so as to thwart any mass unrest against the coup. Thailand has a history of generals taking over power as well as contesting elections to legitimise their rule.
The coup leaders' dissolution of the 1997 Thai Constitution could be because of two major factors. First, because it allows even a single party to contest elections. Secondly, it does not empower the King to appoint a Prime minister to overcome a political crisis. It was not that the prospects of a military coup did not cross the mind of Thaksin Shinawatra. In fact, back in April 2006, consequent to rumours of a military coup, he had summoned a meeting of military officers to tighten his control over the government. Even at that time, the Deputy Commander of Internal Security Operations, Panlop Pinmanee, had hinted that a military coup was inevitable if political instability continued. He had remarked that political instability would have an adverse impact on the share prices, the Thai currency and even on investment, all of which would snow ball into a larger public grievance. He had warned that in such a situation an intervention by either the King or the military could not be ruled out. These remarks did not find favour with Thaksin and so when a junior army officer was arrested near his house in August with a car laden with explosives, he immediately used this as a pretext to sack General Panlop Pinmanee. This dismissal and the prosecution of some military officers along with the ambivalent stance taken by Thaksin with regard to his candidature for Prime Ministership and his postponement of the elections, provided the spark for the recent coup.
Though it is quite early in the day to arrive at a concrete prognosis, it is clear that the military would seek legitimacy for its actions from the Thai King, as is evident from the fact that the army run radio-station has been playing songs in praise of the king since the coup began. Though there are hints that the Opposition would repose faith in the Army, for his part the King has to come to terms with the changed political scenario in Thailand and assure the country's population that democracy would indeed return. If the political crisis were to continue indefinitely with no signs of a return to normalcy, it would have adverse consequences on the Thai economy and society.
Terrorism has been wracking Jammu & Kashmir over the last two decades and the state has seen various shades of terrorist activities - from the violent aggressive phase involving fidayeen attacks on the camps of the security forces (SF) to the car bomb attacks that were witnessed last year to the present phase of grenade attacks, which can be considered a low cost but high impact option for the terrorists. Terrorist activities are presently more pronounced in the Kashmir Valley, whereas the number of terrorist initiated incidents have reduced in the Jammu region. The reasons for this are many - the induction of fresh terrorists as well as the funding and supply of weapons and explosives is extremely difficult in the tough mountainous terrain South and West of the Pir Panjal Ranges in districts such as Doda, Kathua and Udhampur. The resident terrorists in the area are presently in a state of low morale, as a large number of senior leaders have been killed in the recent past. In addition, adequate funds are not reaching them and weapons and ammunition are also in short supply. The aim of the ISI and the tanzeem leaders in Pakistan is, therefore, to regain the lost initiative and bring these areas back into national and international focus.
The security forces have had considerable success in eliminating a number of terrorists from their mountain hideouts in the Jammu region. They have achieved this by expanding their bases to remote inaccessible areas and through good quality human intelligence, better weapons and equipment and dynamic deployment. Most of the terrorist tanzeems like the Hizbul Mujahideen are without effective leadership and their cadres are demoralized and lying low. There has been a spate of surrenders this year. Inter-tanzeem rivalry is also on the rise. The days when the terrorists used to seek encounters with the security forces are nearly over and today they fire only when trapped in a hideout or caught in an ambush. IED attacks on SF columns have reduced considerably and the Jammu-Srinagar highway in the stretch South of the Jawahar tunnel remains incident free even during the time of the Amarnath Yatra. Due to their dwindling numbers and to evade detection, terrorists are now moving in smaller groups (generally comprising two to three terrorists). The SF have consequently changed their tactics and cover more areas with smaller patrols from their operating bases.
The low state of morale among terrorists is due to a number of reasons. The free flow of money has been checked through better intelligence. At the same time, there has been a reduction in infiltration from across the border even as Over ground workers (OGWs) have been neutralised. The position of the terrorists is such that they are resorting to extortion and criminal activities to survive. The flow of weapons and ammunition has been reduced to such an extent that they are resorting to snatching outdated .303 rifles from Village Defence Committees and Special Police Officers. Needless to add, these vintage rifles cannot match the superior firepower available with the SF. In the last few months, a number of .303 rifles have been recovered from killed or surrendered terrorists. Moreover, there is also an acute shortage of AK ammunition due to which terrorists are forced to conserve the limited stocks available with them. Heavier calibre weapons like rocket launchers and Pika machine guns are provided only to the senior cadres and are seldom used for firing on the security forces or their camps due to inadequate ammunition.
Due to lack of ideological motivation, committed cadres, shortage of weapons and ammunition, and reduced funding, recruitment to the terrorist ranks is on the decline. The youths who join voluntarily are attracted more by the life style of the terrorists rather than being motivated by any genuine cause. The number of hardcore Pakistan-trained and foreign terrorists has declined significantly and there is a crisis of leadership. Good human intelligence has not only enabled the killing of senior terrorist commanders but also the seizure of a large number of weapons and explosive caches.
The ISI is, however, trying to impose foreign terrorists at the upper rung of leadership in these areas to check surrenders and motivate the cadres. It has lost faith in the local leadership, which is not implementing its diktats and instead seems to prefer to lie low. All out efforts are also being made to revive terrorism by infiltrating more armed cadres across the LoC before the passes close in the coming winter. This is a crucial phase of terrorism in the region and it must be ensured that the designs of the ISI and the tanzeem leaders in Pakistan are defeated.
A lot of development work is being carried out in the State and Jammu region is also getting its share of development projects. For its part, the Indian Army has also carried out a number of projects under Operations Sadbhavna and Ujala to facilitate development in remote inaccessible areas. This has generated much goodwill for the Army. More job opportunities are being provided to the youth to wean them away from militancy. A number of Territorial Army (Home & Hearth) battalions have been raised in which the local youth have been recruited. Democracy has gained roots as was witnessed in the large turnout for the local body elections earlier this year.
While all these have created a positive outlook among the people, it is essential that we build on these successes by further improving the socio-economic conditions and generating job opportunities for the local people. Jammu has a great potential in regard to scenic, adventure, pilgrim and spiritual tourism, and can easily compete with Gulmarg in the Valley. At the same time, given the region's rich deposits of gypsum, coal, lignite and other minerals, there is potential for investments and job generation in these spheres. These are aspects that cannot be neglected in the struggle against terrorism.
Anxiety and uncertainty are perceptible even as Bangladesh prepares itself for the next elections scheduled for January 2007. As the incumbent BNP government prepares to transfer power to a caretaker government by the end of October 2006, there is a sense of visible unease about Bangladesh's political future, as many issues pertaining to these elections remain unresolved. It appears that a few issues need an amicable settlement before the ruling party hands over power to the caretaker government. The most controversial among these are the voters list, the role of the Election Commission, the next head of the caretaker government and electoral reforms. Unless addressed, these issues could lead to a re-enactment of the 1996 political situation in which the Awami League refused to participate in the elections.
It is important here to detail some vital issues that are likely to impinge upon the outcome of the forthcoming elections. A proactive Chief Election Commissioner, who gave scant regard to judicial guidelines regarding the preparation of electoral rolls, produced a voluminous new list in May 2006 in which the names of some genuine voters were found missing. The Opposition accused the government of enumerating only its supporters and excluding genuine voters, and rejected the voters list. The Supreme Court finally intervened to declare the list as null and void and instructed the EC to prepare a new list as per the earlier guidelines. It was alleged that the controversial voters list excluded members of the minority communities, as it was feared that they would help the electoral prospects of the Awami League. Interestingly, the voters list prepared by the Election Commission in August 2006 has put the number of eligible voters at a staggering 9.30 crores though the 2001 census data prepared by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics shows 8.02 crores as the number of eligible voters. It is important to mention here that the voters list prepared in 2000 listed a total of 7.48 crores as eligible voters.
The role of the Election Commission in this entire affair has been controversial. The Opposition has been demanding the appointment of a new Chief Election Commissioner since they fear that the elections would not be held in a free and fair manner under the current commissioner, retired Justice M. A. Aziz who is a controversial person and a political appointee. To make matters worse, the ruling party has proposed one of its sympathizers, retired Chief Justice K. M. Hasan, as the head of the caretaker government. Hasan was earlier the BNP's international affairs secretary, and this has given rise to concerns about his neutrality in the forthcoming elections. It is important to note here that the last retired Chief Justice takes over as the Head of the Caretaker government. The BNP government's intentions to install Hasan as the next head of the caretaker government became clear when the retirement age of the Supreme Court Chief Justice was increased.
The ruling party has rejected the Opposition's demands for reforms to the caretaker government system. At the same time the future of political reforms is in limbo as the Awami League and its allies have refused to participate in any discussions on electoral reforms as long as the Jamaat is part of the committee that has been constituted to discuss the issue. As the government hardly has any time even to contemplate reforms, it wants to pass on the responsibility to the next caretaker government, which does not have the mandate to introduce such changes. Since the neutrality of the caretaker government itself is questionable, it is doubtful whether the reforms will come through before the elections. The Opposition is also critical of the idea of placing the army under the control of the President, who is also the Supreme Commander of the Army. Instead, it wants the defence portfolio to rest with the caretaker government, since its function is only advisory and confined to the conduct of elections. It is therefore less likely to use the armed forces. The Opposition has also raised the demand that the President should act strictly on the advice of the caretaker government.
Interestingly, in spite of the political impasse, both political parties are gearing for the next elections. If the BNP is obstinate on its political stance in not conceding any of the Opposition's demands, the Awami League is similarly showing no signs of political accommodation. Both parties are gauging the public mood with regard to their respective political positions. They are organizing meetings and public rallies to apprise people on various issues. The civil society in Bangladesh, which has voiced its opinion on the issues of corruption, violence, religious militancy, etc, has now banded together and is organizing meetings and discussion to make people aware of various issues so that they make a rational political decision. This has come under severe criticism from the government, as the ruling party feels that this is giving impetus to the anti-incumbency factors that would adversely affect its political future.
As the Awami League, which is heading a 14 party alliance, has forged a joint front for the next elections, the BNP does not feel confident of contesting the elections without expanding its support base. It has used both carrots and sticks to win over General Ershad to boost its support base in North Bengal. It has exonerated him of various corruption charges to facilitate the alliance. The BNP is also racked by a tussle between the young Turks and the old guards, which has at times led to embarrassing outburst in public. Though the Prime Minister's intervention has saved the party from internal crisis, senior leaders feel sidelined by Tariq Rehman, Senior General Secretary of the BNP who also happens to be the son of Begum Khalida Zia.
Some other issues that are likely to be important in the next elections are the growing religious extremism, spiralling price rise of essential commodities, the BNP's approach to various bomb blasts, political killings, and attacks on media and journalists. There has not been any progress in the investigation into political killings, the various bomb blasts and the attack on the British High Commissioner in Sylhet, as well as the arms haul in Chittagong. Though the government arrested the prime accused in the August 17, 2005 bomb blasts, it has not shown much seriousness in investigating the main organisers and funders behind the co-ordinated bomb blasts that took place in 63 out of the total 64 districts. In spite of a ban, some of these militant organizations are active and function openly. For example, the banned Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami recently held a meeting in the capital's Baitul Mukarram mosque under the banner of Sachetan Islami Janata (Conscious Islamic People) with the knowledge of the government. This raises serious doubts about the government's sincerity in dealing with the issue of religious militancy.
Bangladesh's struggle to strengthen its democratic institutions continues. The judiciary has been demanding separation from the executive for the past few years. The electoral machinery has been politicised. The ruling party has appointed several officers in key positions who can influence the electoral process. This practice of large-scale institutional engineering to influence the elections in favour of the ruling party is not a new phenomenon in Bangladeshi politics. For example, newspaper reports indicate that recent appointments to 700 posts are related to election activities, including the appointment of 300 Upazilla election officers. Appointments are made in such a fashion that if one officer is removed there is every chance that the succeeding officer would most likely be sympathetic to the incumbent government.
Though Bangladesh has witnessed the largest voter turn out among the practicing democracies of South Asia in all its Parliamentary elections, it is the poorest in terms of governance. It is the most violent society and political violence has been an endemic feature. The frequent hartals that paralyse the country, the personal political antagonism between the two main leaders, the use of paramilitary forces and extra judicial killing to bring in a semblance of orderliness, and the attack on Ahmadiyas and minorities have left its imprint on the polity and the economy. The activities of the government have come under severe criticism by international agencies and donors. But the government is in no mood to listen. Unless a level playing field is created and steps taken to ensure free and fair elections, Bangladesh will head towards greater uncertainty instead of a smooth democratic transition.
In his latest address to the Indian Council of World Affairs on India's regional policy, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran reflected that the government had a long-term vision of an integrated South Asia, in which geographical boundaries would become irrelevant. With this in mind, New Delhi has put in place a number of measures to help connect with other countries in the region. Significantly, the Foreign Secretary's speech highlighted India's changing policies towards China. He underlined that borders should be seen as connectors and that the government had in recent years made a conscious attempt to treat India's border regions as integral to its foreign policy.
In the new grammar of globalisation, India is finally kicking off a massive programme of road building along its entire border with China after decades of neglect. The government wants "connectivity" to define its relations with the neighbourhood, which would have the constructive effect of making borders irrelevant. Emphasising on infrastructure development as "transmission belts", the Foreign Secretary said, "The sobering reality is that despite the initiatives of the past few years with Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Myanmar and others, we have not even been able to get back to the connectivity which existed in South Asia before 1947." That is why the "first order of business" is to resume the traditional linkages and even upgrade them. A coherent policy to build several new strategic roads along the India-China border area and to improve its internal connectivity right up to the disputed border is a belated reversal of old policy, which displays a new sense of self-confidence in the Indian government.
As part of its emphasis on development of infrastructure along the international boundary, India has finalised 27 projects for construction of new roads in the India-China border area over the next four years. The government has earmarked Rs 900 crore for transforming the border areas. This includes construction of 862 kilometres of new roads in the India-China border area. Besides, the government is also examining proposals for constructing more roads along the Indo-Nepal and Indo-Bhutan borders. In addition, India has proposed the launch of cross-LoC bus services between Kargil and Skardu in PoK and Jammu and Sialkot. These, together with the existing Delhi-Lahore and Srinagar-Muzaffarabad routes, would considerably help to link India and Pakistan. New Delhi is also upgrading and constructing integrated state of the art checkpoints on its borders with every neighbour. Besides the old Nathu La trading post, New Delhi wants to open another border trading point with China at Gumla.
Efforts to improve connectivity along the India-China border is gaining momentum after the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) gave the green signal to build roads for the first time in the inaccessible and rugged terrain of the Himalayan borderland. According to official sources, these developmental plans are part of the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) - a comprehensive approach of the Indian government to transform the border regions.
The BADP was started during the Seventh Plan with the twin objectives of balanced development of sensitive border areas in the western region through adequate provision of infrastructure facilities and the promotion of a sense of security amongst the local population. Further, in the Eighth Plan, the programme was extended to States that share international borders with Myanmar, China, Bhutan and Nepal. At present the BADP covers all the seventeen States, namely Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal and West Bengal, which share an international border with neighbouring countries. According to officials of the Union Home Ministry, while till 2005-06 the allocation for infrastructure development was Rs 320 crore annually, it was raised to Rs 520 crore for 2006-07. The Centre has directed all states that share international borders to prepare an action plan for the development of infrastructure. And the Planning Commission has said that if the development projects are carried out properly then the amount could be raised to Rs 1,000 crore in 2007-08.
Shyam Saran's reflections on improving connectivity also make economic sense for India. Access routes are extremely useful if a state is to expand its political potential outward. They permit the establishment of political and diplomatic contacts, of alliances between states with common or complementary interests, and also provide services essential for promoting development. It plays a significant role in influencing the patterns of distribution of economic activity and improving productivity.
Although India is an immediate neighbour to China and a natural partner in making 'the vision of an Asian century' into a reality, the connectivity and linkages between the two countries are quite sparse. However, India is exercising its strategies in multiple ways. On the one hand, it is accelerating co-operation with China at all levels, while on the other it is busy expanding co-operation with many of China's neighbours. It appears that such a well-calculated strategy would gradually enlarge the space of Indian interests while at the same time helping the country emerge as a key balancer to China.
The globalisation of the economies of India and China will lead to their integration with the neighbouring regions. And both countries have begun to appreciate the importance of improving the connectivity of their remote provinces. At the same time the economic dimensions of national strategy are pushing them towards opening up these territories for trade and economic cooperation with the neighbouring regions. This involves re-establishing their historical connectivity and trading routes.
India's size, strategic location, trade interests and a security environment that extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east and from the Central Asian Republics in the north to near the equator in the south, underpin India's security response. In view of this strategic spread, it is essential that India expands its wings omni-directionally. India's strategic manoeuvres can succeed if there is a softening of national borders to facilitate the creation of cross- border connectivity. It will find it easier to pursue its natural interests if it chooses to transform the Himalayas from a barrier to a bridge.
Despite the cease-fire, the Nepalese Maoists are busy collecting illegal taxes, besides carrying out abductions, extortion and forceful recruitment. They are consolidating their bases in urban areas where they had a very poor presence till April 2006, and are recruiting new cadres with the objective of setting up a communist society, if the peace talks fail. In the last four months, the strength of the Maoist armed cadres has increased from 29,000 to 35,000. While the Nepal Army is confined to its barracks, the Maoists are reportedly carrying their arms and moving freely. On September 3, 2006, Maoist chief Prachanda clearly stated that "The People's Liberation Army will not be confined in cantonments before the state is completely restructured for solving problem." Since the declaration of cease-fire on April 26, 2006, a total of 25 violent incidents, including 12 abductions and five incidents of extortion, have been reported in Nepal. The Maoists have also killed 11 civilians in separate incidents. It seems that in case the peace talks fail, the Maoists may not go back to their base areas in the country's mid-western region but would rather fight from their newly formed urban base areas. Their commitment to the peace talks in the wake of these developments seems doubtful.
The Maoist armed struggle is never confined to military action alone. To destroy the existing political structure, if possible, the Maoists use passive strategy very creatively. In an interview to A World to Win in 2001, a magazine published by the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, the Maoist chief Prachanda said "Our guiding principles on the question of negotiations are the experiences of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty under Lenin's leadership and the Chongqing negotiations under Mao's leadership," which suggests that revolutionaries utilise periods of negotiations and ceasefire to regroup and prepare their forces for the future offensive. Nepal's Maoists have been engaging in precisely this tactic for the last four months and had also taken recourse to this approach earlier. Thus the politics of ceasefire essentially provide them an opportunity to consolidate bases in new areas and fashion their image before the international community.
The continuation of violence is a breach of the 25-point code of conduct signed between the interim government and the Maoists to carry forward the present peace process. These activities could jeopardise the entire peace process. According to the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) spokesperson Azad, the interim government in Nepal is unlikely to work, because of the two diametrically opposite class interests of the Maoists and the Koirala government. The violent activities of the Maoists indicate more their commitment to party ideology than to democracy.
On the political front, despite the 12-point agreement between the Maoists and the Koirala government, they have failed to reach consensus over contentious issues like Maoists surrendering their arms and the future of the monarchy. While the Prime Minister is arguing in favour of a Constitutional Monarchy, the Maoists are demanding a Republic. Further, the Communist Party of Nepal (UML), the second largest political party in the country and a member of the Seven Party Alliance, is suggesting the setting up of a Democratic Republic system. Moreover, the Maoists have been demanding an early dissolution of the restored House of Representatives and they have also refused to disarm until an interim government has been formed. They are also accusing the government of succumbing to pressure from foreign powers (India and the United States) and the King to wreck the peace talks. The situation became serious when the Maoists came to know that the government tried to obtain weapons from foreign countries despite engaging them in peace talks. All these have made the Maoists ask for a quick political resolution, failing which they would begin a powerful campaign against the Koirala government.
The Maoists are believed to have discussed with the Chinese government in July 2006 the idea of setting up a Republic in Nepal. On July 1, 2006, three Chinese government officials reportedly made a secret trip to Nepal to hold talks with top Maoist leaders. Prof. Wang Je Chuan, a former counsellor at the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu and known to have contacts with the Maoists, was reportedly part of the Chinese team. Significantly, China has never promoted democracy in its neighbouring countries but has invariably supported authoritarian regimes.
China is also quite concerned over recent political developments including the possible presence of foreign countries in Nepal. It is apprehensive about the presence of the United States and other foreign powers near its border as part of the UN monitoring mission, which the Nepalese government has recently asked for. It presumes that democracy and a US presence in Nepal could adversely affect its Tibet policy. At the same time, given that China is increasingly becoming energy dependent due to rapid industrialization, it hopes to use Nepal's untapped water resources for generating hydroelectric power. Since India is also a strong contender in this respect, China wishes to neutralize New Delhi's influence in Nepal by supporting the Maoists and using the latter's anti-India feeling for its own purposes.
Despite India's mediation between the Seven Party Alliance and the Maoists and support for the peace process, the Maoists continue to accuse India of supporting the Monarchy. They believe that India follows what they call the 'Nehru doctrine' under which it supposedly seeks to interfere and dictate terms to its neighbours.
The recent activities of Nepal's Maoists appear to be pressure tactics to enhance their bargaining power during the next round of peace talks with the government as well as in negotiations with UN representatives over arms management. Simultaneously, they hope to neutralise India's influence in Nepal's domestic affairs by inclining towards China. During the impending fourth round of peace talks, pressure tactics would help to obtain better bargains from the SPA. However, the change in the Maoists' position from that of a collaborator to a negotiator with the SPA, coupled with their raising of unacceptable demands, could jeopardise the ongoing peace talks.
The killing of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, popularly known as the "Tiger of Balochistan" in the early hours of August 27 in an army operation has ominous implications for the restive province. The tribal chief of the largest Baloch tribe, the Bugtis, was a strong proponent of Baloch autonomy, and had said that he had been a Baloch for several centuries, a Muslim for 1400 years but a Pakistani for just over fifty. Although a government-sponsored council reportedly attended by the Waderas of all subclans of the Bugti tribe had, on August 17, stripped Nawab Bugti from the leadership of the tribe and had announced an end to the Sardari system, the spontaneous popular reaction to his killing indicates that he had lost neither his aura nor his authority. Over six hundred people are reported to have been arrested. There have been riots in Karachi and Quetta. Violence has been reported from across the length and breadth of the province. A shutter-down and wheel-jam strike was observed on August 28 throughout the province and vehicular traffic had come to a grinding halt. Trains to and from Quetta were cancelled, as the railway authorities were reluctant to ply them without adequate security.
The public school educated octogenarian had played a major role in the politics of Balochistan for over five decades, but was a relatively late convert to the cause of Baloch nationalism. Till his recent falling out with the Pakistani establishment, he had been one of its pillars in the region. A former chief minister, he was the first Baloch in the Pakistani cabinet (he held the home and then the defence portfolios) and was the governor of the province during the last major conflagration in Balochistan in 1973. He was accused of operating private jails and running a feudal justice system in his area. His running feud with Kalpar Waderas, the hereditary head of the Kalpar sub-clans, had led to the forced migration of over 10,000 Kalpars from Dera Bugti. At the time of his killing, he was the leader of Jamhoori Watan Party, with representatives in both the provincial assembly and the parliament. His recent attempts to get all Baloch nationalist parties under one roof, however, did not bear fruit since other Baloch Sardars did not trust him due to his role in 1973.
In 2005, Bugti lands were the scene of pitched battles fought between security forces and the Baloch nationalists. In January 2005, the alleged rape of Dr. Shazia Hasan, an employee of Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), by an army officer in Sui, had led to violent attacks on the gas complex. Gas supplies were disrupted and it took weeks to restore normalcy. The pitched battles at Sui had jolted the Pakistani economy and the Karachi Stock Exchange ended up losing almost half its net worth. The security forces had then tried to eliminate Nawab Bugti by shelling his ancestral house at Dera Bugti in March 2005. Although 17 shells pierced through his residence, he survived in a hair's breadth. However, the day long shelling claimed 67 lives, including 33 members of the minority Hindu community who inhabited the neighbouring Hindu ghetto, and resulted in injury to over 100 people and severe damage to a number of houses and temples. The Nawab had to flee Dera Bugti early this year and take refuge in the mountains, from where he had been co-ordinating the Baloch resistance.
The killing of Nawab Bugti has been criticised by almost all opposition political parties in Pakistan. What is more surprising is that many top leaders of the ruling party, including two former prime ministers, have termed the incident as unfortunate, while the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which is a key constituent of the federal government as well as of the Sindh government, has squarely criticised the government action. Widespread criticism of its act has forced the government to refute original reports that the tracking of Bugti's satellite phone had helped the security forces to pinpoint his location, which implied that he was indeed the target. According to the government's latest version, the area was targeted after an Army helicopter overflying the area came under heavy fire from the rebels and the resultant battle led to the caving in of the mud bunker where the Bugti along with his men had taken shelter. The fact that the rebels killed over 20 elite commandos indicates that the former gave the security forces a tough fight before capitulating.
Despite the government's attempts to portray him as an autocratic feudal despot, Sardar Akbar Khan Bugti, on account of the circ*mstances and the manner of his death, is destined to become a martyred hero for Baloch nationalism like 80-year old Nauroz Khan before him, who had taken on the Pakistani Army in 1958. By killing Bugti, General Musharraf has earned the permanent enmity of the Baloch population. He has probably underestimated Baloch nationalism, which has led the Baloch to confront the Pakisani establishment four times since its creation. A spokesman of the Baloch nationalists said that despite the death of Akbar Bugti, their struggle would continue. In his death, Nawab Bugti has probably provided the fractured Baloch polity a rallying point. Ironically, death may help him achieve what he failed to during his lifetime - the unity of all Baloch nationalist groups.
